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IMPLEMENTING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:  
EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS ON THE IMPACT AND ACCOUNTABILITY  
OF THE UN GLOBAL COMPACT  
ABSTRACT 
The implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is crucial for organizational 
legitimacy in today’s globalized world. In the absence of a global governance system, several 
initiatives have emerged to support companies in designing, implementing and 
communicating CSR. However, research has so far mainly neglected to empirically evaluate 
the impact of such initiatives on organizational practices. This study aims to close this gap by 
analyzing on a large quantitative basis how business participants in the largest voluntary CSR 
initiative - the UN Global Compact (UNGC) - embed CSR into their organizations. Drawing 
on insights from institutional and stakeholder theory, I derive determinants of UNGC 
implementation and analyze the accountability of the initiative. My study contributes to the 
literature in several ways: I develop a theoretical model to describe and explain variation in 
UNGC implementation, and scrutinize the new measure for UNGC implementation. My 
results show that the initiative affects organizational practices: Contrary to the bluewashing 
arguments of UNGC critics, the level of CSR implementation increases with the time of 
membership in the UNGC. However, my findings also suggest that the declared participant 
information still lacks credibility - higher UNGC implementation levels are not associated 
with significantly less UNGC scandals.  Implications for CSR research, the Global Compact 
and its participants are discussed.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has gained such prominence in theory and practice 
(McKinsey & McKinsey 2007, The Economist 2005, Margolis and Walsh 2003, De Bakker et 
al. 2005, Lockett et al. 2006) that its organizational implementation is evolving to one of the 
key challenges (Gilbert and Rasche 2008, Knudsen 2011, Lindgreen et al. 2009, Maon et al. 
2009). In the process of globalization, many companies extended their operations across 
national boarders and gained greater economical and social power than some governments 
(Garriga and Melé 2004). With increasing transnational corporate activities, the power of 
national governmental agencies to sufficiently regulate multinational corporations (MNCs) 
and to produce public goods is eroding (Scherer and Palazzo 2008, Habermas 2001, Kobrin 
2001). Social and environmental externality problems, such as human rights violations, global 
warming, or corruption have reached a level at which they can no longer be managed by 
unilateral national policy alone due to their transnational causes and effects.  
While there has been growing legislation on transnational business activities over the last 
decades, governments have so far failed to appropriately address these social and 
environmental challenges on an international level (Boatright 2000, Velasquez 2000). In 
consequence, the expectations of various societal actors for businesses to take on public 
responsibilities have increased (Aguilera et al. 2007, Campbell 2007, Crane and Matten 2004, 
McKinsey & McKinsey 2007: p.7). The pressures are real, as industry leaders like Nike, 
Exxon, Nestlé, and Pfizer can attest (Maon et al. 2009). Companies may hence no longer act 
solely as isolated players but more and more as political ones (Kaul et al. 2003, Matten and 
Crane 2005, Scherer, Palazzo and Baumann 2006).  
Social Accountability Initiatives like the UN Global Compact (UNGC), the SA 8000 social 
accountability standard or the ISO 26000 CSR standard constitute a promising approach for 
businesses to complement efforts by legislation to better address social, environmental and 
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corporate governance issues (Hess 2001, Gilbert 2003, Frost 2005, Christmann and Taylor 
2006). However, the effectiveness of CSR implementation through social accountability 
initiatives has received only limited empirical attention despite its significance in the 
corporate world (Christmann and Taylor 2006, Maon et al. 2009, Margolis and Walsh 2003, 
O'Rourke 2003, Runhaar and Lafferty 2009).  
Scholarly research has so far mainly focused on the business case of CSR (Margolis and 
Walsh 2003, Orlitzky et al. 2003) or the business-society interface from a macro perspective 
(Crane et al. 2008). Further, CSR has mainly been treated as a domestic phenomenon (see for 
example: Christmann and Taylor 2006), thus lacking a global perspective (Scherer and 
Palazzo 2007, Scherer and Palazzo 2008). We therefore do not know much about how 
businesses implement global CSR standards in their organizational structures and procedures. 
The few exceptions empirically analyzing the implementation of the largest voluntary CSR 
standard worldwide – the UNGC - are based on a few cases only and were not designed to 
assess impacts through membership (Baumann and Scherer 2012, Rieth 2009) or examined 
only particular CSR policies relying on implementation measures not directly tied to the 
UNGC principles (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2010).  
The aim of this work is to fill-in this void by conducting a large-scale empirical analysis 
describing and explaining variation in UNGC implementation. The initiative encourages 
businesses to support 10 universal principles in the areas of human rights, labor standards, the 
environment, and anti-corruption (see Appendix 1). The overarching goal of the UNGC is to 
serve as a longtime CSR learning-platform (Rasche 2009). However, critics point to the 
initiative’s lack of accountability mechanisms and implementation guidance stimulating the 
misuse of the UNGC as a marketing tool (Hemphill 2005, Williams 2004). This possibility to 
“bluewash” a company’s image through association with the (blue) UN flag raises the key 
question of how well the initiative is working. Put differently, “what is the impact of this 
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initiative on firms as well as on society?” (Knudsen 2011). Until recently, it has hardly been 
possible to quantitatively analyze the implementation of CSR in such an extended context. 
Only since the introduction of the UNGC “Differentiation Programme” in February 2011, the 
Compact provides its members with the possibility to choose between different levels of CSR 
implementation – Learner, Active, and Advanced. Companies aiming for Advanced 
implementation have to fulfill a list of Advanced implementation criteria and best practices.  
I develop a model of UNGC implementation depicting the impact of UNGC membership as 
well as general determinants of implementation. While recent practitioner studies ascertained 
a rather high impact on CSR implementation through UNGC membership, critics especially 
from academia continue to deny any such impact. To solve this puzzle, I assess the UNGC’s 
net impact based on the objective and easily observable measure “UNGC membership time” 
by analyzing whether longer time members implement the initiative at higher levels than 
newer members. As a UNGC member, companies have to continuously collaborate and 
communicate with their stakeholders through several UNGC network events. Stakeholder 
theory (e.g. Donaldson and Preston 1995, Freeman 1984, Jones 1995) suggests that such a 
management of stakeholder relationships has an impact on organizational practices.  
In order to analyze this possible impact of UNGC membership, I control for common 
determinants of CSR to create a comprehensive model of UNCG implementation.  
Before actually empirically testing the model, I analyze the appropriateness of the new 
“Differentiation Programme” to serve as a valid CSR implementation measure based on the 
theoretical assessment tool by Baumann and Scherer (2012), which is by now to the best of 
my knowledge the only assessment tool directly referring to the UNGC. 
By studying implementation trends for a great number of business organizations, I have to 
rely on the information declared by participants. This relates to the second crucial issue for an 
initiative like the Global Compact, which is to achieve accountability (see for example 
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Hemphill 2005, Rasche 2009, Williams 2004). Accountability in the UNGC would imply that 
the information declared by participants is generally trustworthy. Previous research has 
shown, however, that formal CSR implementation can be significantly “decoupled” from 
actual day-to-day implementation (Aravind and Christmann 2011, Behnam and MacLean 
2011). The UNGC however has realized several steps towards reducing the risk of 
decoupling, e.g. by providing clearer guidance on UNGC implementation, and by raising the 
cost of adoption as well as the transparency of the initiative by introducing a “Communication 
on Progress” policy.  
To examine whether this extended accountability structure generally ensures that declared 
implementation corresponds with actual UNGC implementation, I use the following 
approach: Given that the newly introduced implementation criteria aim to stimulate the 
alignment of company structures and processes with the 10 UNGC principles, we may expect 
the likelihood of a firm’s future actions conflicting with the 10 principles to go down in the 
case of substantial implementation. Contrarily, there is little reason to assume that an 
exclusively symbolic UNGC implementation lowers a firm’s CSR scandal likelihood. To 
measure the firm’s risk of conflicting with the 10 UNGC principles, I use comprehensive 
media data on corporate risks regarding exactly these principles. 
I will hence analyze the relationship between UNGC implementation and corporate UNGC 
risks to get insights on whether declared implementation corresponds with actual 
implementation.  
The following two research questions are consequently underlying my study: 
1. Does UNGC membership time affect declared UNGC implementation? 
2. Does the new UNGC accountability structure ensure that declared UNGC 
implementation corresponds with actual UNGC implementation? 
 6 
IMPLEMENTING CSR IN THE GLOBAL COMPACT: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE 
While the question of why companies assume social responsibilities has been intensively 
covered in the literature (Vogel 2005), the question of how they implement CSR in the 
organization has long been neglected despite its high practical relevance. Literature on CSR 
over the last decades mainly concentrated on whether CSR is good business (Orlitzky et al. 
2003, Margolis and Walsh 2003, Peloza 2009). Margolis and Walsh (2003) reviewed 
literature on CSR between 1972 and 2002 and found that most reviewed studies treated CSR 
as a “black box” independent variable, while only 15 percent examined CSR as the dependent 
variable. In particular, ambiguities exist on which business practices should count as socially 
responsible behavior (Lindgreen et al. 2009) and even less is known on how organizations 
implement such activities (Rasche 2009, Christmann and Taylor 2006).  
Recently, Social Accountability Initiatives like the UN Global Compact (UNGC), the SA 
8000 social accountability or the ISO 26000 CSR standard have emerged as a promising way 
for businesses to address social, environmental and corporate governance issues in the 
absence of a legally binding global governance system (Hess 2001, Gilbert 2003, Frost 2005, 
Christmann and Taylor 2006). However, the effectiveness of these initiatives regarding the 
promotion of CSR implementation has been questioned and received only limited empirical 
attention up to now (Christmann and Taylor 2006, Maon et al. 2009, Margolis and Walsh 
2003, O'Rourke 2003, Runhaar and Lafferty 2009). While there is some evidence that under 
certain conditions, international certifiable standards like the ISO 9000 general management 
standard or the ISO 14001 environmental management standard impact organizational 
practices (Christmann and Taylor 2006, Potoski and Prakash 2005), research on the 
effectiveness of global standards like the UNGC covering the whole CSR spectrum so far rely 
on few cases only (Baumann and Scherer 2012, Runhaar and Lafferty 2009), employ a 
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domestic focus (Rieth 2009), and/or use measures for UNGC implementation that are either 
binary or lack a direct reference to the intitative (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2010, Perez-Batres 
et al. 2011). 
In this study, I want to close the knowledge gap on the effectiveness of global voluntary CSR 
standards by theoretically developing and empirically testing a model of CSR implementation 
in the largest voluntary CSR initiative worldwide - the UN Global Compact. I use the UNGC 
as a framework to define corporate socially responsible behavior and assess the 
implementation of CSR in organizational structures and processes for the following reasons: 
1) Theoretical fit: The UNGC best employs the extended notion of CSR in a context 
of global business activities in the absence of a global governance system (Matten and Crane 
2005, Scherer et al. 2006). In today’s globalized world with national state actors losing more 
and more momentum in controlling increasingly trans-nationalized corporate activities, 
Matten and Crane (2005) propose an extended view of CC as “the role of the corporation in 
administering citizenship rights for individuals”. According to this definition, corporations act 
as a provider of social rights, an enabler of civil rights and a channel for political rights. 
However, corporations need legitimacy for their actions (Suchman 1995). Scherer et al. 
(2006) argue that „In the current transition from a stable industrial society to a globalized 
post-industrial society, (...), moral legitimacy has become the core source of societal 
acceptance.“ The interest of corporations to gain (moral) legitimacy by joining the Global 
Compact can be well explained in our present context with more and more fragmented 
regulatory authority leading to joint governance efforts by public and private actors (Scherer 
et al. 2009). 
Matten and Crane (2005) as well as Scherer et al. (2006) refer to the UNGC as a 
comprehensive initiative capturing their extended CSR concept. 
„The UN global compact illustrates the capacity that international institutions have to 
create platforms for self-regulation and deliberation between corporations and civil-
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society actors concerning global social and environmental challenges.“ (Scherer et al. 
2006) 
 
Similarly, the UNGC summarizes its objective as follows: 
Amid a backdrop of rising concerns about the effects of globalization, the Secretary-
General called on business leaders to join an international initiative - the Global 
Compact - that would bring companies together with UN agencies, labour, non-
governmental organizations and other civil-society actors to foster action and 
partnerships in the pursuit of a challenging vision: a more sustainable and inclusive 
global economy. (Global UNGC 2002)  
It is to note that the Global Compact has been referred to as both a CSR and a “Corporate 
Citizenship” (CC) initiative. While some scholars even equated the notions CSR and CC (see 
for example Carroll 1979, Carroll 1991, Carroll 1998), I refer to the UNGC as just one 
particular form of CSR or CC. As there may also be forms of CSR or CC in the literature with 
a different focus, my arguments and findings may only be applied to CSR or CC in general 
with caution. 
2) Scope: The Global Compact is the largest and arguably most ambitious voluntary 
CSR initiative (Banerjee 2007, Rasche 2009, Vormedal 2005). Unlike for example the ISO 
14001 environmental management standard or the SA 8000 social standard, the principles of 
the UNGC span the whole spectrum of CSR issues ranging from human rights and labor 
standards to environmental and corporate governance issues (for an overview of CSR 
standards and institutions, see: Waddock 2008, Gilbert et al. 2011). 
3) Measure: The UNGC recently introduced a new policy called “Differentiation 
Programme” to provide a comprehensive measure for CSR implementation that differentiates 
between different stages of progress. In the methods section, I will analyze whether this 
policy constitutes an appropriate framework for measuring CSR implementation based on the 
theoretical implementation tool of Baumann and Scherer (2012), which is to my knowledge 
the only existing academic tool appropriate to assess UNGC assessment. 
Large existing initiatives trying to assess CSR like the Dow Jones Sustainability Index 
(DJSI), the Financial Times Stock Exchange 4GOOD (FTSE4GOOD) index, or the 
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“FORTUNE World’s Most Admired Companies” list lack a direct reference and theoretical 
correspondence to the underlying extended CSR concept. 
 
The United Nations Global Compact: Toward a refined accountability structure. 
Initiated by the former UN secretary general Kofi Annan at the World Economic Summit in 
Davos 1999, the UNGC was formally launched on 26 July 2000. The initiative engages the 
private sector to collaborate with the United Nations to identify and spread good practices 
regarding its 10 universal principles (Ruggie 2001) in the area of human rights, labor rights, 
protection of the environment, and anti-corruption (see Appendix 1). The 10 principles are 
derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Fundamental Principles on 
Rights at Work from the International Labour Organisation, the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
(UNGC 2012a); as such, they enjoy universal consensus among all signatories.  
More and more companies joined the UNGC which soon evolved to the largest corporate 
citizenship initiative in the world (Hemphill 2005) with currently 6,820 business participants 
(data as of 08 January 2012). The primary goal of the initiative is to provide learning 
experience for its members in implementing the 10 UNGC principles.  
Since its foundation, this evolutionary framework has received both a lot of support as well as 
criticism. The two major allegations towards the UNGC stated by a number of scholars (e.g.: 
Hemphill 2005, Rasche 2009, Williams 2004) can be summarized as follows: 1) “The 
Compact’s principles are vague and thus hard to implement.” 2) “The Compact is not 
accountable due to missing verification.”  
Concerning the first allegation, Deva (2006) criticizes that the UNGC principles hardly 
provide concrete guidance to companies about their expected conduct. Although corporations 
have to report on their progress made regarding the implementation of the 10 principles since 
the introduction of a compulsory “Communication on Progress (COP)”, this policy lacked for 
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a long time standardized criteria as well as incentives for stricter implementation. Given this 
structure of the Compact, it was possible for a participant to highlight just one CSR area with 
a superior record in order to conceal other issue areas with a poorer record (Williams 2004). 
The lack of the Compact’s clarity led to unclear expectations and multiple interpretation 
possibilities among adopting organizations. On the other hand, Rasche (2009) notes that over-
specified principles could even turn out to be counterproductive if they limit the scope of 
possible solutions right from the start. Moreover, the global reach and diverse participant base 
of the Compact requires a certain degree of generalizability of the principles. 
Nevertheless, the conviction emerged on the side of the UNGC that it has to react on regard of 
this “lack-of-clarity” issue. On its 10th anniversary summit, the UNGC and its stakeholders 
decided to further stimulate CSR integration by initiating a program, through which member 
organizations can for the first time differentiate themselves from other members by adhering 
to different levels of CSR implementation criteria. The three basic levels of the so-called 
Differentiation Programme introduced in February 2011 are “Learner”, “Active” and 
“Advanced”. In both the Advanced as well as the Active level criteria (see UNGC 2012b), the 
possibility to highlight just one issue area in order to conceal others of poorer record 
disappears. Companies need to report on each issue area (human rights, labor, environment, 
anti-corruption) separately. Additionally, for the Advanced level, companies have to meet in 
their annual COP reports all of 24 criteria providing detailed guidance for CSR integration. A 
criterion is met when a company communicates its implementation or planned 
implementation of one or more of the commonly accepted best practices suggested under each 
criterion. Companies can only exclude single issues, if they can outline why that particular 
issue is not applicable to the organization’s specific operating context. 
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HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Impact of UNGC membership time on UNGC implementation: Insights from 
Stakeholder Theory  
While there are several conceptual studies that examine the content and structure of the 
Global Compact (Deva 2006, Nolan 2010, Williams 2004, Thérien and Pouliot 2006), there 
are almost no empirical insights about the impact of the initiative on existing business 
practices (see Rasche 2009, Schmitz et al. 2011, Knudsen 2011). Empirical studies on this 
matter so far mainly focus on few cases or certain policies only, are perception based and/or 
use measures that fail to capture the comprehensiveness of the UNGC (Bernhagen and 
Mitchell 2010, Baumann and Scherer 2012, Schmitz et al. 2011, Knudsen 2011, McKinsey & 
McKinsey 2007). No theoretical model has thus far been developed to capture the net impact 
of the UNGC together with general determinants for UNGC implementation. One of the most 
crucial questions regarding the UNGC hence remains to be answered: Have business 
participants changed existing practices over the time of UNGC membership? 
While this may seem self-evident for some scholars, others propose that companies simply 
join to benefit from the good UN reputation without changing anything (see Deva 2006, 
Williams 2004). 
The goal to enhance corporate learning is demonstrated in the Compact’s network structure 
(Palazzo and Scherer 2010, Rasche 2009, Williams 2004). The central actors of this network 
structure are businesses, governments, civil society organizations and labor. To link these 
actors, the UNGC established three engagement mechanisms: learning events, dialogue 
events and partnership projects. Learning and dialogue events are closely related. The former, 
however, particularly focus on sharing pre-established solutions and best practices while the 
latter specifically aim to find new ideas to promote the 10 UNGC principles. Learning is 
supposed to occur both on the global level through direct interaction at International Learning 
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Forum Meetings and the UNGC website, and on the local level in so-called network 
meetings. On both levels, this sharing of best practices and following of notable examples 
among participants is crucial for learning (Rasche 2009). Indeed, Cetindamar and Husoy 
(2007) found that UNGC membership has led to better networking opportunities. According 
to a survey by Vormedal (2005), local networks have been attended regularly and participants 
indicate that meetings have been fruitful thanks to the more intense and small-scale 
interactions that allowed them to learn from one another’s experiences.  
Regarding a concrete and measurable outcome of UNGC membership, Mwangi, Rieth and 
Schmitz (2011) suggested an impact of certain learning networks on business routines; 
however, they only analyzed local learning opportunities based on the analysis of two local 
networks. Their results are therefore not be generally valid and further neglect learning effects 
of other networks e.g. International Learning Forum Meetings among others. The complete 
effect of stakeholder networking on UNGC implementation hence remains to be examined. 
The UNGC approach for achieving learning experience through networking and dialogue can 
be theoretically explained through insights from stakeholder theory. Stakeholders are 
commonly defined as those “groups or individuals who can affect, or are affected by, the 
achievement of an organization’s mission” (Freeman 1984: p. 54). Stakeholders (e.g. NGOs) 
are the central actors that produce accountability standards like the UNGC and are supposed 
to benefit from their implementation (e.g. employees). As such, stakeholders shape the 
discussion of how standards are put into practice (Gilbert and Rasche 2008). In his 
instrumental stakeholder theory, Jones (1995) argues that certain types of CSR (or corporate 
social performance) implementation are manifestations of attempts to establish trusting, 
cooperative firm/stakeholder relationships. Scholars therefore widely agree that firm 
interaction with stakeholders is a driver for UNGC implementation (Simmons 2009, Schmitz 
et al. 2011) or CSR in general (Campbell 2007: p. 962), given that these societal actors have 
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vested interests in seeing the commitment translate into actions. There are several CSR 
integration process models developed on the basis of particular company cases, the most 
prominent of which is arguably the one by Zadek (2004) about Nike. However, many scholars 
argue that there is no “one best way” to manage organizational change (Burnes 1996), and 
research has so far failed to develop one accepted organizational learning theory (Crossan et 
al. 2011). In this context, we can understand why the recent CSR implementation framework 
of Maon, Lindgren and Swan (2009) incorporating previous literature on the process of CSR 
implementation remains rather abstract. Yet, one means to achieve change in this framework 
underpinned all other CSR implementation steps: “continuous stakeholder dialogue”. Burns 
(2004) argues that learning about stakeholder expectations and the specific operating context 
help to make the change beneficial and support it with the appropriate mechanisms.  
Previous empirical studies suggest that learning indeed occurs among UNGC members 
(UNGC 2011, McKinsey & McKinsey 2007). The results may be treated with caution, 
however, as these studies had to rely on the perceptions of the participants themselves. 
Following the arguments from stakeholder theory and previous empirical findings, I expect 
that the UNGC stakeholder engagement events lead to higher UNGC implementation. Due to 
the considerable number of networking events available for UNGC members, we may assume 
that - on average - the total amount of a company’s stakeholder engagement increases with 
the time of UNGC membership. Given that all existing documents for implementation 
guidance are publicly available, there is in fact no other direct benefit exclusively available 
for UNGC members. Hence, membership time can be used to capture the amount of a firm’s 
stakeholder engagement within the UNCG, and as such to assess the impact of UNGC 
membership as a whole. Consequently, my first hypothesis states as follows: 
Hypothesis 1. Participants of longer membership time have achieved higher levels of 
UNGC implementation than newer ones. 
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Unfortunately, this hypothesis is no tautology. It would be very wishful, if the mere presence 
of learning opportunities produced measurable outcomes. Yet, companies may just be more 
interested in UN reputation spillovers than in learning. Given that there is no conventional 
enforcement process installed, companies might actually be able to follow this intend (Deva 
2006, Williams 2004), which I will outline when deriving my second hypothesis below. 
Controlling for general determinants of UNGC implementation 
We have to acknowledge that the impact of stakeholder management through UNGC events is 
highly situational and dependent on a number of factors. According to previous research, 
most of these factors relate to the visibility and the resources of the firm as well as the 
institutional background wherein the CSR dialogue takes place (Mitchell et al. 1997). To be 
able to trace the net impact of the Global Compact’s learning and network events, we have to 
take into account such conditions under which higher implementation is more likely to occur. 
Deriving hypotheses of UNGC implementation regarding each of these previously identified 
CSR determinants would necessitate a more differentiated level of analysis going beyond the 
scope of this study. I will therefore rather briefly summarize the key arguments of prior 
research, and use these variables as controls. 
Firm size 
Scholars have identified the increasing scope and economic interdependence of many 
corporations as important drivers for adopting CSR initiatives (Baron 1995, Kostova and 
Zaheer 1999, Porter and Kramer 2006, Vogel 2008). Previous empirical results suggest that 
bigger firms are more likely to join the UNGC (Bennie 2007), while we do not know yet 
whether they are also better implementers. 
The bigger a firm, the more visible become its actions and the more scrutiny they get (Baker 
2010). Large firms are most likely to respond to demands for change and engage in political 
activity. Due to a greater market power but also a higher likelihood of being involved in 
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economic and political conflict, they are more likely to benefit from their engagement with 
international governmental or non-governmental organizations (Bennie 2007). Furthermore, 
the capacity to become politically active increases with firm size (Martin 2000).  
Similarly, the amount of available (financial) resources is likely to explain CSR investments. 
Without separately controlling for the effect of available resources, we assume that larger 
firms are more likely to have discretionary resources to invest in CSR (see also Jackson and 
Apostolakou 2010). 
Assuming that CSR is no longer understood as a binary yes-or-no task, the risk of economic 
and political conflict as well as the scrutiny by external actors may not simply disappear when 
joining the UNGC. We may therefore expect that larger firms not only use their greater 
resources and capacity to join the Global Compact (Jorgensen 2006), but also to better 
implement its principles.  
It is to note that the outlined argument about the relationship between company size and 
UNGC implementation refers particularly to the UNGC as well as to other forms of “explicit” 
CSR engagement. Using the implicit-explicit CSR terminology of Matten and Moon (2008), 
it appears plausible that smaller firms do not necessarily act less responsible than bigger ones; 
rather, they may approach CSR issues in more implicit ways without experiencing the need to 
explicitly formulate CSR policies and structures as required for higher levels of UNGC 
implementation.  
Taking these arguments together, we may expect that bigger firms are more likely to 
implement the UNGC at higher levels than smaller ones. 
Beyond a firm’s visibility and its resources, the institutional context in which the firm 
operates may shape decisions to implement the UNGC. Institutional theory suggests that 
business organizations are embedded in a nexus of formal and informal rules (North 1990). 
According to neo-institutional theory, companies adopt institutionalized forms of behavior in 
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a pursuit of gaining internal and external legitimacy (Scott 1995). In certain institutional 
contexts, the behavior of companies over time may strongly resemble one another - a process 
referred to as institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Institutional 
perspectives on CSR hence suggest that firm decisions are framed in a broader social context, 
for example by drawing upon available narratives and benchmarks against prevailing norms 
or existing practices (Humphreys 2008). 
Scholars have proposed a variety of such institutional factors (Campbell 2007, Ioannou and 
Serafim 2010, McWilliams and Siegel 2001). Based on these works, the following three 
factors can be identified as the most important ones. 
National institutional conditions 
When looking at the geographical concentration and dispersion of UNGC member 
companies, it becomes apparent that the interest into the UNGC is strongly dependent on 
country contexts. For example, US companies are heavily underrepresented in the Global 
Compact, whereas companies from France and Spain are highly overrepresented. However, 
the mere fact that companies from certain countries are more likely to join the initiative does 
not tell us whether these companies are also committed to better implement its 10 principles. 
Campbell (2007) proposes certain national institutional conditions of socially responsible 
behavior. He identifies a strong and well-enforced state regulation as the most obvious driver 
for CSR and supports his claim by analyzing US firm behavior in response to waves of US 
regulation and deregulation in the course of the twentieth century. Further, Campbell (2007) 
identifies that the presence of strong trade or employee associations, if organized in ways 
contributive to socially responsible behavior, is a strong driver for CSR integration. 
One prominent possibility of grouping such national institutional conditions into a rough 
framework is by looking at different types of national business systems (Aguilera et al. 2007, 
Matten and Crane 2005, Jackson and Apostolakou 2010). Usually, two types of national 
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business systems are distinguished. 1) Liberal Market Economies (LME) characterized by 
equity financing, dispersed ownership, active markets for corporate control, weak inter-firm 
cooperation and flexible labor markets, and 2) Coordinated Market Economies (CME) 
characterized by long-term debt finance, ownership by large block-holders, weak markets for 
corporate control, stronger inter-firm cooperation and more rigid labor markets (Jackson and 
Apostolakou 2010). Typical LME systems can be found in the US and the UK, while CME 
systems are typically found in Continental Europe or Japan (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
The two characteristics identified above, state regulation and employee associations, are 
closely associated with the CME national business system. Jackson and Apostolakou (2010: 
p. 375) therefore propose that “firms with headquarters in CME countries will adopt more 
extensive CSR practices relative to similar firms with headquarters in LME countries.”  
However, assuming again that the UNGC is a more explicit form of CSR, companies from 
CME countries may take certain responsible practices for granted without explicitly 
communicating them through highly visible international accountability. In contrast, firms 
from LME countries may seek to compensate for lacking state regulation and employee 
association by voluntarily adopting more explicit forms of CSR (Jackson and Apostolakou 
2010, Khanna et al. 2006). 
Again, it is beyond the scope of this study to analyze in detail under what particular 
conditions which of the two directions of argumentation might prevail. Previous empirical 
results of Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) - analyzing CSR scores according to another 
highly visible and explicit international CSR initiative, the Dow Jones Sustainability Index -  
suggest that CSR scores are higher for companies in LME countries, arguably because 
institutionalized coordination may substitute for explicit CSR practices. Translating their 
argument to the context of this study, one may expect UNGC implementation to be higher in 
countries with liberal market economies as opposed to coordinated market economies. 
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It is to note, that there are other explanations for cross-country variations in CSR 
implementation. Brammer et al. (2006) for instance argue that higher CSR levels can more 
likely be found in economically and politically more developed regions. According to their 
analysis, there are no close associations with high profile CSR issues in Eastern Europe, and 
as such local stakeholder expectations regarding CSR issues are lower. Despite a great 
plurality of legitimacy threats in regions like South America, Africa, and the Middle East, 
MNCs located there may experience a lower impetus for good CSR integration than those 
with headquarters in Western Europe (Brammer et al. 2006). 
Industrial sector 
Institutional conditions may not only vary across countries but also across industrial sectors. 
As the main challenges are similar to companies of a certain industrial sector, so may be the 
approaches these companies take towards CSR. Sectors hence represent an important 
boundary of institutional fields (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The two most recent studies 
available on this issue (Jackson and Apostolakou 2010, Knudsen 2011) argue that the impact 
of a firm’s CSR activities on stakeholders differs across industrial sectors. In sectors with 
higher (perceived) impact on stakeholders, expectations e.g. by consumers or NGOs may also 
be higher. Consequently, managers in sectors where firms have a strong negative impact upon 
stakeholders might have more to gain when minimizing risk, e.g. through implementing CSR 
policies (Jackson and Apostolakou 2010). Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) distinguish 
between industries with high, low/medium, and mixed impact on stakeholders based on the 
sector classification by the FTSE4Good index. The former category is mainly comprised of 
manufacturing sectors, i.e. automobiles, basic resources, chemicals, construction and 
materials, food and beverage, oil and utilities, plus two service sectors: retail and utilities. Of 
those industries, central stakeholders like investors, consumers, the local community, and 
NGOs perceive oil and gas companies as especially risky. The medium/low impact industries 
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consist of banks, consumer goods, consumer services, financials, insurance, media, 
technology, telecommunications, travel and leisure. Finally, health care, and industrials are 
classified as mixed industries.  
Yet, sector-riskiness is only one possibility to explain variations in UNGC implementation. 
Two other prominent sector specific factors are the degree of competition as well as industrial 
self-regulation (Campbell 2007).  
Ownership structure 
Finally, findings of previous studies about the UNGC suggested that beyond size, region and 
sector, the type of a company’s ownership structure may explain the decision to join the 
UNGC (UNGC 2011) or engage in CSR in general (Atkinson and Galaskiewicz 1988, Graves 
and Waddock 1994, Johnson and Greening 1999). As argued earlier, the visibility of a firm 
and the amount of scrutiny a firms gets may determine the degree of UNGC implementation 
(Baker 2010). This argument not only refers to the size of a company, but also its type of 
ownership, especially regarding the distinction between private and public ownership. As the 
Swiss MNC Glencore recently experienced when changing from private to public ownership 
status, stricter reporting and transparency requirements sharply increase the firm’s visibility 
together with its amount of public scrutiny.  
Further, the analysis of Graves and Waddock (1994) indicated social performance is 
positively correlated with the number of institutions holding the shares of a company. In 
another study, it was found that companies gave less money to charity if the CEO or some 
other individual owned a significant percentage of the company’s (Graves and Waddock 
1994). Considering these arguments, on may expect that the benefits of stricter UNGC 
implementation are greater for public firms - being more visible and more dispersedly owned 
- than for private ones. 
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Again, this argument only applies for more explicit CSR activities. Private companies may 
well engage in other forms of CSR, which may arguably be of more implicit kind. 
Accountability of the UNGC: Substantial versus symbolic UNGC implementation 
and its societal outcome 
Rasche (2009) identified the allegation that “the UNGC is not accountable due to missing 
verification” as the most popular critique that has consistently appeared since the foundation 
of the Global Compact by both academics and practitioners (Deva 2006, Engardio 2004, 
Nolan 2010, Rizvi 2004, June 24). This criticism threatens the legitimacy of the initiative 
(Williams 2004). Deva (2006) and Rizvi (2004) argue that such a lack of accountability 
fosters the misuse of the Global Compact as a marketing tool. From a neo-institutional 
perspective (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Deephouse and Suchman 2008, Suchman 1995), 
organizations are likely to adapt to a changing institutional environment as a result of their 
pursuit to gain or preserve legitimacy. If these institutional expectations, however, seem to 
conflict with the interests of the organization, the management may try to gain legitimacy 
without actually changing business practices by decoupling formal structures from actual 
daily operation (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Oliver 1991, Scott 1995).  
Behnam and MacLean (2011) developed a framework indicating that standards fulfilling 
certain conditions - being clearly defined, having a high cost of adoption, requiring evidence 
of compliance and levying significant sanctions for non-compliance - are typically less likely 
to be decoupled. Their analysis suggested that these characteristics are missing in the 
Compact. Critics therefore continued to call for verification mechanisms (Williams 2004). As 
a response to such criticism, the UNGC introduced in 2006 a “Communication on Progress” 
(COP) policy. Since then, member organizations were required to communicate on a regular 
basis with the UNGC to reconfirm their commitment towards the 10 UNGC principles and 
outline the progress made and/or planned. Further, members are labeled non-communicating 
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if they failed to submit a COP report within one year. After another year of non-
communication, they are delisted from the UNGC (Knudsen 2011). This procedure led to the 
exclusion of 3,028 former members and currently lists 1,554 members as non-communicating 
(data as of 08 January 2012). 
Nevertheless, the Compact maintains its definition as “a voluntary initiative that relies on 
public accountability, transparency and disclosure to complement (already existing) 
regulation” (Global UNGC 2008). The Compact hence continues to abstain from performing 
verification of the disclosed company information itself or through partners. Since 2007, 
however, new participants are screened against various global databases to check if they are 
the subject of sanctions or similar measures (Wynhoven and Stausberg 2010). In the absence 
of direct monitoring or verification, the UNGC hence builds on two mechanisms to assure 
accountability: The power of public transparency and the watchdog role of the media and 
NGOs (Williams 2004).  
As to the first mechanism, Williams (2004) affirms the power of public transparency in the 
UNGC “since companies will include a discussion of their Compact-related activities in their 
annual reports”. Rasche (2009) also highlights that the progress reports mostly contain 
information publicized in prominent company documents that are usually approved by a 
company’s board, and therefore identifies this new policy as a promising way towards more 
accountability.  
Regarding the second mechanism, Compact advocates argue that participants’ stakeholders 
foster a “social vetting” mechanism, i.e. they use submitted reports as a basis to judge 
corporate behavior and file complaints that the UNGC can use as grounds for investigations 
(Rasche 2009, Wynhoven and Stausberg 2010). This way, “NGOs act as watchdog 
institutions that speak up if business participants violate any of the principles” (Rasche 2009). 
Referring to the company Nike as an instructive case in this respect (Zadek 2004), Palazzo 
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and Scherer (2010) ascertain the power of a more and more active civil society that is often 
making cases public where companies fail to live up to their own declarations. With the 
introduction of the COP policy, the precondition for these two mechanisms to work – 
available information - is certainly ensured. 
To conclude, with the recent development of the UNGC, the initiative has made big steps 
towards fulfilling the four conditions of substantial implementation as stated by Behnam and 
MacLean (2011): 
1) A clear implementation guidance is provided by the Differentiation Programme.  
2) The cost of adoption is rather high since the introduction of the regular reporting 
requirements.  
3) Compliance has increased through the public availability of all declared information 
and collaboration with certification based initiatives.  
4) Only sanctions for non-compliance are still lacking beyond potential reputational 
costs of being publicly marked as delisted.  
Again, stakeholder theory can be used to theoretically analyze the effectiveness of these 
accountability mechanisms. In an extended context, the stakeholder concept includes all those 
entities that maintain a “critical eye” on corporate actions (Bomann-Larsen and Wiggen 
2004). This way, stakeholders link the goals and actions of corporations with the expectations 
of society (Whetten et al. 2002). If the stakeholder management process during UNGC 
membership leads to substantial change in organizational practices, this process may 
contribute to the establishment of new critical competencies, resources, and capabilities. It 
thus helps to the minimize risk through the development of better scanning skills, processes, 
and information systems. As a consequence, a company might experience less corporate 
conflicts or - if already faced with a conflict - might be better prepared to appropriately 
manage the crisis (Russo and Fouts 1997). In their integrative empirical study, Orlitzky and 
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Benjamin (2001) indeed found that firm risk decreases with increasing CSP1. It is to note, 
however, that the reviewed studies measured firm risk as the degree of financial performance 
fluctuation, not as intended in this study as the likelihood of facing corporate scandals.  
The best way to test whether the presence of the UNGC accountability mechanisms are 
sufficient for achieving substantial rather than superficial implementation, would be indeed to 
conduct direct monitoring and verification of a considerable amount of participants. As 
outlined, not even the UNGC is capable of bearing the costs for such an endeavor.  
A simpler way to judge about the substance of the UNGC implementation is by looking at the 
central outcome a substantial UNGC implementation is expected to generate. The newly 
introduced UNGC implementation criteria aim to align company structures and processes 
with the 10 UNGC principles. If a company managed to substantially align its structures and 
policies with all 10 principles, the direct consequence is that future risks regarding the 10 
principles decrease. In contrast, there is little reason to assume that a mere symbolic UNGC 
implementation lowers corporate scandals regarding the 10 UNGC principles.  
I consequently assume that the UNGC accountability mechanisms, i.e. the “watchdog role” of 
the media and NGOs together with the power of public transparency, provide enough 
“incentives” for corporations to make correct declarations in the absence of direct monitoring 
or verification structures. This assumption leads to my second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Higher declared UNGC implementation actually leads to fewer UNGC 
related risks. 
 
Theoretical model of UNGC implementation.  
The developed hypotheses on the impact and accountability of the UNGC are summarized in 
the following table: 
                                                 
1 The overall mean observed (robs) between firm risk and CSP was -.15, with a true-score correlation (!) of -.21. 
The causal direction from prior CSP to lagged risk is even stronger (robs = -.20; ! = -.28). 
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----------------------------- 
Insert table 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
DATA AND METHOD 
This work draws upon two separate data sources.  
1) The UNGC business participant database.  The data on UNGC business 
participants was gathered in November 2011. All participant data relevant for answering my 
research questions is publicly available on the UNGC website. Rather than collecting the 
relevant information of every participant individually, I contacted the UNGC office and asked 
for a complete dataset listing all the variables of interest. In response, I received two relevant 
datasets from the UNGC office. One dataset indicated the differentiation level and country of 
all business participants having submitted a COP since the introduction of the program (data 
as of November 29, 2011). The other dataset contained information on the variables UNGC 
entry date, sector, employees, organization type and ownership type of all UNGC business 
participants (data as of December 7, 2011). After merging and cleaning the two lists, my final 
dataset consisted of 2280 UNGC business participants.  
2) The RepRisk AG data on UNGC and CSR risks. To analyze the relationship 
between UNGC implementation and corporate CSR scandals, I draw upon a second source of 
data. This data captures reputational risk and is collected by the Swiss company RepRisk AG. 
RepRisk provides dynamic business data on environmental, social and governance risks for 
investors and prominent corporate sustainability assessment institutions like the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index. Across currently around 70,000 companies and 5,000 projects 
worldwide (data as of 09 January 2012), RepRisk AG collects and evaluates negative media 
coverage to create a reputational risk index „RepRisk Index“: 
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The RepRisk Index ranges from zero (lowest) to 100 (highest). It is calculated based 
on the influence of news sources, the frequency and timing of the news, as well as the 
news content, including the severity (harshness) and novelty (newness) of the issues 
addressed. In order to ensure a balanced and objective rating and weighting, news is 
only entered once into the database, unless it is escalated to a more influential source, 
appears again after six weeks or additional issues emerge. (RepRisk AG, 2012) 
 
In addition, RepRisk AG provides a specific UNGC risk measure:  
The UNGC Principles and issue indexes are derived from the number, severity and 
source of news related to the given entity in the last 6 months. The indexes highlight 
UNGC Principles and issues that are especially controversial and that are being 
covered by relevant sources. (RepRisk AG, 2012) 
 
Given the role of the media as a “watchdog” or social arbiter, media coverage of corporate 
scandals may not be significantly influenced by a company’s CSR reporting. Media 
information on corporate scandals may hence serve as a valid source to monitor and evaluate 
a company’s actual behavior (see for example Bednar 2012, Miller 2006, Wartick 1992), in 
our case to trace the amount of CSR scandals a company is involved in.  
Dependent variable measures 
UNGC implementation. With the newly introduced UNGC Differentiation Programme, we 
have for the first time a comprehensive measure directly capturing different stages of UNGC 
implementation. Previous quantitative studies had to rely on simple bivariate UNGC 
commitment measures, a single policy and/or external rating agencies without direct reference 
to the UNGC (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2010, Knudsen 2011). Before relying on this new 
implementation measure, we need to ensure the theoretical validity of the underlying criteria. 
Baumann and Scherer (2012) are to the best of my knowledge the only scholars who so far 
operationalized the extended CSR concept underlying the Global Compact for better 
organizational implementation (see table 2). In their CC assessment tool, Baumann and 
Scherer (2012) identify three categories that are crucial for organizational CSR 
implementation: commitment, structures & procedures, and interaction. (1) On the 
commitment level, the corporation demonstrates its willingness for systematic CSR 
 26 
implementation. (2) Structures & procedures describe the internal implementation of CC in 
day-to-day activities. (3) Interaction - primarily with external stakeholders - is necessary to 
gain legitimacy (Scherer et al. 2006, Suchman 1995). Under each category, they list specific 
criteria closely tied to organizational and management literature. On the Left side of table 2, 
the highest level of CSR implementation, referred to as “civil” stage (see also Zadek 2004), is 
listed. 
To analyze whether the Advanced criteria are indeed appropriate to depict superior 
implementation of the underlying CC concept, I will compare these criteria with the highest 
level of implementation, the “Civil Stage”, in the Baumann and Scherer (2012) CC 
assessment tool.  
A perfect match, i.e. an exact equivalence, between the two models can be ascertained if the 
following three conditions are met: 1) Every criterion from the CC assessment tool has its 
counterpart in the UNGC Advanced criteria. 2) Every UNGC Advanced criteria has its 
counterpart in the CC assessment tool criteria. Nothing should be demanded for CC 
implementation that cannot be theoretically justified. 3) There are no (or only minimal) 
possibilities to formally circumvent the CC assessment tool criteria through “loopholes” or 
the lack of clarity in the UNGC Advanced criteria. It is to note that it is beyond the scope of 
this study to control for the fact that participants can deliberately make false statements 
regarding the 24 criteria, e.g. companies declaring that their “COP qualifies for Level B or 
higher of the GRI (Global Reporting Initiative) application levels” (criterion 23, suggested 
best practice number two) when in fact they are not. 
Table 2 provides the results of matching the UNGC Advanced criteria with the CC 
assessment tool. 
----------------------------- 
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Insert table 2 about here 
----------------------------- 
Ad 1) The criterion-based comparison shows that, indeed, all CC assessment tool criteria are 
addressed in at least one UNGC Advanced criterion. Several CC assessment tool criteria are 
even addressed in various UNGC Advanced implementation level due to the issue-specific 
nature of the Advanced criteria. The need for specifying implementation criteria for certain 
issue areas has been identified by Baumann and Scherer (2012) as necessary grounds for 
future research. The UNGC Advanced criteria 5-20 address the four issues human rights, 
labor, the environment and anti-corruption with respectively 4 criteria (commitments, 
management systems, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and standardized performance 
indicators). The first condition is therefore fully met or even exceeded. 
Ad 2) After having matched every CC tool criterion with the corresponding UNGC Advanced 
criteria, none of the 24 Advanced criteria remained unconsidered. Hence, the UNGC 
Advanced stage requires nothing that could not be justified on theoretical grounds, so that the 
second condition is also fully met. 
Ad 3) Three CC tool criteria “alignment of incentive structures”, “provision of training” and 
“complaints procedure” are not directly addressed in any of the UNGC Advanced criteria 
itself, but only in one of the suggested best practices of these criteria. This is highlighted in 
table 2 through italic font. As participants only have to fulfill at least one best practice of each 
criterion, they have the possibility to circumvent these three criteria by simply referring to 
another “best practice”. Further, some suggested best practices, e.g. “Allocation of 
responsibilities and accountability within the organization” (UNGC Advanced criterion 5, 
best practice number 4), are less clear-cut than the one regarding GRI application levels 
mentioned above. Due to the existence of these “loopholes” and several remaining 
inaccuracies, the third condition is only partially met.  
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Given the necessity to maintain a certain degree of generalizability within the 24 criteria that 
are valid for all sort of businesses around the globe, some circumventing opportunities or 
inaccuracies may be deemed to be unavoidable. Hence, a “reasonably” good match between 
the two models may still be ascertained. Nevertheless, to eliminate these circumventing 
opportunities and reach the best possible match between the two models, I will specify a 
second UNGC differentiation model, referred to as UNGC+ Implementation. To this end, I 
add a fourth – “Civil” – stage to the three original UNGC Implementation stages. This highest 
achievable stage includes only companies of the original UNGC Advanced level that declare 
to implement all three best practices (alignment of incentive structures, provision of training, 
complaints procedure) in all four issue areas.  
Although the UNGC Advanced criteria can be judged as a theoretically well-informed 
possibility of signaling higher levels of CSR implementation, we still have to keep in mind 
that this differentiation scheme relies on the correctness of the declarations made by the 
participants. The CSR implementation levels as discussed in this work should therefore 
always be regarded as “formally-declared” CSR implementation levels. 
First, I use this original classification scheme to measure the degree of UNGC 
implementation. I assign the different stages the following coding: “Learner“ = 1; “Active” = 
2; “Advanced” = 3. 
UNGC+ implementation. Second, I use the self-constructed UNGC+ classification 
scheme to measure CSR/CC implementation in direct correspondence to the theoretical CC 
assessment tool of Baumann and Scherer (2012). In addition to the coding of the original 
UNGC classification, I code the defined fourth implementation stage “Civil” = 4.  
In a later analysis to trace the outcomes of UNGC implementation, UNGC 
implementation and UNGC+ implementation are used as independent variables. 
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Reputational Risk. I use the RepRisk index from RepRisk AG to analyze a possible 
relationship between UNGC implementation and negative media coverage. As these 
reputational risk indices have to be collected manually from the RepRisk AG website, I 
restrict this part of my analysis on the UNGC business participants that are among the global 
500 companies with the highest turnover (FT500; data as of November 2011). This restriction 
resulted in 160 observations. 
As my insights into the specific calculation of the respective company risk indices are 
limited, I want to base my results on the broadest ground possibly. I therefore use two 
different risk measures, as presented above. First, the UNGC risk measure captures data 
between 21 November 2011 and 21 May 2012, i.e. the 6 month period directly after having 
retrieved the UNGC implementation scores. Second, the general CSR risk measure capturing 
the month of retrieving the UNGC implementation data, i.e. November 2011. In this case, no 
causality will be implied 
Independent variable measures 
Membership time. To be able to analyze the effect of membership time on UNGC 
implementation, I recoded the date of UNGC entry in the dataset into completed membership 
years. 
Control variables 
In my analysis about the effect of UNGC membership time on UNGC implementation, 
I will control for company size, country & region, sector & industry, and ownership. 
Size. I use the number of employees as a measure for company size. The analysis of 
the number of employees across companies in my sample revealed that the presence of 
several very large firms leads to a positively skewed distribution. After applying a natural 
logarithm (ln) transformation to the number of employees, the distribution resembled a 
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normal distribution. I hence include measure company size in my study through the ln 
transformed number of employees. 
Country & Region. Regions enter into my regression analysis as dummy variables; if 
the company is located e.g. in “Western Europe” its value is 1 for this region dummy and 0 
for all others. In the regression, the country dummy “United States of America” is omitted 
and serves as a reference point for a typical liberal market economy against which more 
coordinated market countries can be compared.  
Countries with 50 or more business participants in the UNGC are listed separately. It is hence 
not included in the region dummy variable; for example, “Germany” is listed separately 
having 82 business participants in the UNGC, and the “(Rest of) Western Europe” dummy 
excludes these companies.  
The regional categorization is based on the UN statistics division data on the composition of 
macro geographical (continental) regions and geographical sub-regions. In addition, I grouped 
the Carribeans and Central American companies together into “Central America”; for further 
specification, I defined the regional category “MENA” as those countries originally 
associated with the Middle East and North Africa. 
Sector & Industry. As with the “country” variable, I transformed “sector” and 
“industry” into dummy variables. I grouped the sectors as classified in the dataset obtained by 
the UNGC office into 19 “supersectors” and 10 industries as defined by the Industry 
Categorization Benchmark (ICB), 2011. 
Ownership. In the dataset obtained from the UNGC office, business participants are 
grouped into four different types of ownership (public, private, state-owned, subsidiary), 
which also go into the regression as dummy variables. 
Analyses 
 31 
In this paper, I rely on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analyses. This implies that 
we no longer treat the different implementation levels as ordinal ranks. Instead we assume an 
interval scale, i.e. that the distance between each level is equal. To be sure that this interval 
scale assumption does not significantly change our results, I applied an ordered probit model 
in addition, wherein the different levels are treated as purely ordinal. 
The two models of table 3 analyze the determinants of UNGC implementation; the first model 
uses UNGC Implementation, the latter UNGC+ Implementation as dependent variable.  
The four models of table 4 analyze the relationship between UNGC implementation and CSR 
or UNGC risk. The first two models use the RepRisk measure for UNGC risks, while the 
latter two models use the RepRisk measure for general social and environmental risks. The 
first and third model use the original UNGC implementation measure, while the second and 
fourth model use the UNGC+ implementation measure. 
In all models, I tested for heteroscedasticity by applying the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
test (see Breusch and Pagan 1979). The test revealed that heteroscedasticity is indeed present. 
To reach robustness against heteroscedasticity, i.e. to be sure that a possible presence of 
correlated or not-normally distributed residuals does not invalidate my statistical significance 
tests, I applied a robust variance estimator, typically referred to as Huber, White or sandwhich 
estimator (see for example White 1980). 
RESULTS 
Descriptive observations 
Of all 2280 business participants, almost a quarter (23%) implements the UNGC at the 
Learner stage, the vast majority (71%) is at the Active stage while only a very tiny fraction 
(6%) declares to implement the UNGC at the Advanced level. For the 160 UNGC participants 
listed in the FT500, the fractions of Learner (10%) and Advanced (24%) implementers are 
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almost inverted compared to the total sample, with the Active implementers still constituting 
by far the biggest fraction (66%). Similarly to previous UNGC publications (Global UNGC 
2011), more than half of the companies (52%) are located in Europe. The two other prominent 
regions for UNGC business membership are Latin America (including Central America and 
the Carribeans) (18%) and Asia (16%). Further, also present in my sample is the remarkably 
small portion of North American UNGC companies (5%), which scholars explained as a 
result of the more litigious society in North America than in Europe or Latin America 
(Hemphill 2005, Williams 2004). Companies from the rest of the world (Africa, Middle East 
& North Africa, Oceania) together account for only 8 percent of UNGC participants in my 
sample. With the underlying coding, the total mean of UNGC implementation in the sample is 
1.82, hence slightly below the Active level. This mean is distributed by region in a relatively 
small range between 1.77 (Oceania) and 1.91 (Middle East and North Africa MENA). While 
the mean of European UNGC implementers is slightly lower (1.81) than the total mean, the 
average implementation level of business participants from the three German speaking 
European countries Austria (1.94), Germany (1.85) and Switzerland (1.88) is well above the 
total mean. In North America, US business participants achieve an average UNGC 
implementation score (1.84) above the total mean, while the implementation mean of 
Canadian companies (1.81) is slightly below the total mean. 
Hypothesis 1: Impact of UNGC membership time on UNGC implementation 
The regression analyses of table 3 report the effect of membership time on UNGC 
implementation. Both complete models of table 3 are significant (F 7.7 and 8.6) and explain 
15 percent of the variance (R2 = 0.15).  
----------------------------- 
Insert table 3 about here 
----------------------------- 
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In both models, membership time has a significant positive influence on UNGC/UNGC+ 
implementation. This result suggests that both the Compact criticism in Academia as well as 
the enthusiasm among Compact business members has to be reconsidered. On the one hand, 
the highly significant positive relationship between the time of membership in the initiative 
and the degree of implementation makes it difficult to deny any impact on organizational 
practices. On the other hand, the very little size of the effect (ß = 0.02) suggests that the 
existing practitioner studies about the UNGC impact may have some upward biases. 
We have to recall that this effect only reflects the net impact of UNGC membership, i.e. it 
excludes learning effects from sources outside the Compact. 
We further have to keep in mind that the underlying data is cross-sectional and does not trace 
the implementation scores of participants over time. Nevertheless, we can analyze the effect 
of membership time on UNGC implementation in more detail by applying “lowess 
smoothing”, a procedure which carries out locally weighted regression of membership years 
on UNGC implementation (figure 1).  
----------------------------- 
Insert figure 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
If we assume that UNGC participants on average undergo a similar development of CSR 
implementation, we can interpret the graph in figure 1 as a learning curve. If we further 
exclude learning opportunities outside the Compact, this figure reveals a slight decline of 
UNGC implementation in the first two years of membership, which is followed by a 
continuous increase of UNGC implementation in the years thereafter. Under these 
assumptions, participants would reach the Active level after 10 years of membership. Due to 
the recently introduced one-time 12 months grace period for companies at the Learner stage, 
the average duration for reaching the Active level is expected to diminish significantly. The 
 34 
direction and significance of this relationship remain unchanged when applying an ordered 
probit analysis. 
Overall, these findings ascertain the UNGCs impact on organizational implementation of the 
10 principles and thus provide support for my first hypothesis.  
General determinants of UNGC implementation (controls) 
Table 3 also provides the results for determinants of UNGC and UNGC+ implementation. 
All four types of determinants (national institutional context, size, sector, ownership type) 
influence UNGC implementation.  
Size 
Size significantly and strongly increases UNGC implementation, measured by the (ln) number 
of employees.  
This results thus supports previous findings stating that higher visibility and capacity of large 
companies lead to higher CSR implementation. 
National institutional context 
My results show that UNGC implementation can vary significantly across countries. 
However, this variation seems not to depend on the type of national business systems as 
postulated by previous scholars (Jackson and Apostolakou 2010, Khanna et al. 2006). Indeed, 
implementation scores of companies in the liberal market economy system of the UK do not 
significantly vary from scores in the US. On the other hand, most companies from countries 
with a coordinated market economy do not implement significantly lower than the US 
benchmark. In fact, of such countries, only French companies are implementing the UNGC 
significantly lower than the US, whereas companies from Japan, Italy and Spain are 
implementing significantly higher.  
Industrial sector 
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Surprisingly, only very little variation of UNGC implementation can be explained by the 
sectoral context of a firm. Taking the Automobiles & Parts sector as the benchmark category 
of a high impact sector, company levels of UNGC implementation in most other sectors do 
not significantly differ. The only significant result is that companies in the Utilities sector 
implement the Global Compact significantly higher than companies in the Automobiles & 
Parts sector. There are no sectors classified with a low or medium impact that implement 
significantly lower than our benchmark sector of the high impact category. 
These results therefore again tend to contradict the postulations of prior scholars (Jackson and 
Apostolakou 2010, Knudsen 2011) explaining differences in CSR implementation by 
different degrees of perceived negative sector impact on stakeholders.   
Ownership type 
Finally, my results suggest that the type of ownership explains variation in UNGC 
implementation. Public companies implement the Compact significantly higher than private 
ones. These results are hence in line with prior literature arguing that stronger visibility and 
dispersion of ownership in publicly owned companies is a strong driver for UNGC 
implementation.  
Hypothesis 2: Accountability of the UNGC – declared implementation and CSR 
scandals 
Finally, table 4 provides results for the relationship between UNGC implementation and CSR 
or UNGC risks. All complete models 1 to 4 are significant. They all explain around 35 
percent of the variance (R2 between 0.346 and 0.348). The control variables size, region, 
industry and ownership type show a significant effect on the dependent variable.  
----------------------------- 
Insert table 4 about here 
----------------------------- 
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Models 1 and 2 use the particular UNGC risk measure covering the six month period after the 
UNGC implementation scores have been retrieved. Neither model 1 using original UNGC 
implementation as independent variable nor model two using UNGC+ implementation reach 
significant results.  
Models 3 and 4 use data about UNGC implementation and reputational risk of about the same 
time period: the implementation scores are retrieved on 29 November 2011. The reputational 
risk index thus captures all negative media coverage released in November 2011. 
Consequently, we can analyze the simultaneous relationship between the two variables, yet 
without tracing causality. The independent variables UNGC Implementation and UNGC+ 
Implementation both show a negative relationship to the dependent variable (ß = -0.672 and -
0.884), which however is not significant.  
To mitigate the problem of reverse causality, i.e. the possible effect that companies join the 
UNGC because of recent bad press, I used a one-month time lag between data on UNGC 
implementation levels and reputational risks (not reported here). The data on reputational risk 
used in these models covers the period of 1 to 30 December 2011, while all other data in the 
models stays unchanged. The findings remain mainly the same: They suggest a negative yet 
insignificant relationship between the two variables of interest. Incorporating causality in my 
argumentation, we can now argue that higher formal CSR implementation in the UNGC 
reduces reputational risk. However, this influence remains insignificant, at least in the short 
run, given a one-month time lag. 
Having analyzed both the specific UNGC risk measure as well as general CSR risk measures 
of two different time periods, we did not find significant results supporting the argument that 
higher declared UNGC implementation leads to lower CSR or UNGC risks.  
Hence, my second hypothesis has to be rejected. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact and accountability of the UN Global 
Compact. Two research questions therefore guide this study.  First, “Does UNGC 
membership time affect UNGC implementation?” and second, “Does the new UNGC 
accountability structure ensure that declared UNGC implementation corresponds with actual 
UNGC implementation?”.  
I focused on the worldwide largest voluntary CSR initiative – the UN Global Compact – to 
analyze these questions, since this initiative best captures the extended CSR concept 
underlying my study. To be able to comprehensively answer my two research questions, I 
included several data sources. The first source depicts information about UNGC participants 
and their level of CSR implementation. I checked the theoretical validity of the underlying 
UNGC differentiation criteria before relying on the CSR implementation levels in this data. 
The second data source reports the level of CSR or UNGC risk of a sub-sample of 
participants in my study – UNGC members listed in the “FT Global 500”. 
Major findings 
The matching between the only existing theoretical assessment tool referring to the UNGC of 
Baumann and Scherer (2012) with the UNGC Differentiation Programme revealed, that the 
UNGC has developed a theoretically informed model of differentiating CSR implementation 
among its participants despite the existence of some “loopholes” and inaccuracies regarding 
certain best practice formulations. These “loopholes” can be closed by compulsorily 
prescribing participants aiming for the Advanced level to incorporate three CSR elements in 
all four issue areas: “Alignment of incentive structures”, “provision of training”, and 
“installation of a complaints procedure”. 
My results clearly suggest a positive albeit moderate learning effect among participants 
regarding UNGC implementation. This effect is based on the CSR implementation according 
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to both the original UNGC Differentiation Programme as well as the UNGC+ Differentiation 
scheme. Further, the learning effect is apparent in both the OLS and the ordered probit 
analysis. These findings support my first hypothesis and contribute to the CSR literature by 
ascertaining the UNGC its capability to fulfill its primary mission – providing learning 
experience.  
Previous research has mainly neglected to analyze such an effect on a comprehensive 
quantitative basis. The existing quantitative studies relied on personal opinions about the 
“Impact of Global Compact participation on corporate responsibility policies and/or 
practices” (UNGC 2011). In the 2010 UNGC implementation survey, only 16 percent stated 
that the Compact has a minimal impact (5% assigned no impact to the Compact). The vast 
majority (79%), however, stated that the Compact has at least a moderate impact. The UNGC 
study of McKinsey & Company (2007) reports similar findings with 59 percent of the 
respondents declaring to do much more toward the Compact’s principles than 5 years ago.  
To assess the level of CSR implementation, my study also relies on participant declarations. 
However, to derive the UNGC’s impact on organizational practices over the years, I draw 
upon the objective measure membership time. This allows us to solely regard the net impact 
of UNGC membership. My findings suggest that the impact on UNGC implementation solely 
derived from UNGC membership is much lower than suggested by participants of the 2010 
implementation survey. If the UNGC was the only platform for learning to enhance CSR 
implementation, the membership time coefficient ß = 0.02 in my analysis would imply that 
companies need on average 50 years to advance from one differentiation level to the next. In 
this respect, we need to scale down the very optimistic expectations regarding the UNGC’s 
impact suggested by previous studies. 
We further found that firm size as well as public ownership are positive drivers for UNGC 
implementation. While national and industrial institutional factors also tend to influence 
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UNGC implementation, the relationship cannot be explained by distinguishing between two 
types of national business systems or between certain degrees of negative industry sector 
impact on stakeholders. 
Regarding my second hypothesis about the accountability of the UNGC, i.e. the impact on 
declared implementation on UNGC risks, the analysis revealed a negative albeit insignificant 
relationship between the two variables. Companies declaring to implement CSR at higher 
levels face insignificantly less UNGC or CSR risks than companies declaring to implement 
CSR at lower levels. Under the assumption of a negative relationship between actual CSR 
implementation and reputational risk, these findings suggest that declared UNGC participant 
information is at least partly decoupled from actual implementation. We may hence be careful 
to take all information at face value. On the contrary, my findings did not provide evidence 
for systematic decoupling among UNGC members, which I would have expected in the case 
of a positive relationship between formal CSR implementation and bad press. 
Implications for the UN Global Compact and its Participants 
My results suggest that the Compact in its present form, with the established structures (e.g. 
learning events, dialogue events, partnership projects) and policies (e.g. COP, Differentiation 
Programme) is indeed capable to stimulate learning. However, the Compact and its 
participants need to be aware of the modest size of the initiatives’ impact. In future surveys, 
the UNGC may ask respondents about the impact of a list of other CSR initiatives in addition 
to the UNGC, which may lead toward a more realistic evaluation of the Compact’s net 
impact. 
My findings further suggest that the UNGC in its current state is not at the edge of losing its 
legitimacy as a result of lacking accountability. The negative (yet insignificant) relationship 
between CSR implementation and bad press may suggest that, on the one hand, the Compact 
is not a venue for opportunistic behavior helping companies to bluewash a poor CSR record. 
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On the other hand, due to the lack of significance in this relationship, we cannot conclude that 
higher formal CSR implementation necessarily implies higher actual implementation, which 
one might expect to go hand in hand with less UNGC or CSR risks in general. This finding 
implies that companies do not need to fear a reputational loss if they are joining the UNGC to 
improve CSR implementation. On the contrary, companies may be warned that the mere fact 
of entering the Compact is not enough for bluewashing their damaged reputation.  
Limitations and Future Research 
Of course, this study has its limitations, some of which might serve as a basis for future 
research. First, to assess CSR implementation on a large quantitative basis, I have to rely on 
the information declared by participants. Due to the accountability mechanisms in place – 
transparency and the “watchdog” role of the media – a possible decoupling of declared from 
actual implementation may be mitigated. If, however, the central aim of the researcher is to 
explore the gap between declared and actual CSR implementation in the best possible manner, 
it appears inevitable to include qualitative studies, at the cost of lacking generalizability. By 
qualitatively studying one or more of the companies examined by Baumann and Scherer 
(2012), it may already be possible to trace the development of “decoupling” over time. 
Another constraint is the largely cross-sectional nature of the underlying data. Hence, we have 
to be careful not to neglect the possibility of reverse causality. Regarding my first research 
question, it appears impossible that the decision to formally implement CSR at high levels 
influences the time a company has been a UNGC member. However, it may influence the 
decision to exit the Compact. This possibility is excluded in my study, which is restricted on 
current UNGC participants only. Moreover, the assertion of a learning effect through UNGC 
membership in my study is based on the assumption that each company enters the UNGC 
with on average the same level of existing CSR and undergoes on average the same learning 
process during its membership. This implies for example that, today, a company with 10 years 
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of membership implemented CSR 8 years ago at the same level as a company with 2 years of 
membership in my current sample. We have to be aware that such an interpretation neglects 
time dependent CSR implementation trends beyond the effect of UNGC membership. To 
avoid this causality issue, future research needs to work with longitudinal data tracing CSR 
implementation levels of each UNGC participant over time. In a next study, I therefore plan 
to incorporate the annual UNGC implementation surveys conducted since 2006 with around 
1,000 respondents each in my analysis.  
The issue of reverse causality is particularly present in my second research question 
concerning the relationship between UNGC implementation and negative media coverage: 
High implementation may lead to less bad press; or, bad press may influence the decision to 
declare high implementation levels in an attempt to bluewash a poor CSR record. To make 
judgments beyond a mere correlation between the two variables and mitigate the problem of 
reverse causality, I included a second data set on reputational risk with a one-month time lag. 
This relatively short time lag, however, may not be sufficient to clearly distinguish between 
the two effects. Future research should therefore study this relationship with larger time lags, 
which is not yet possible with my data at this point in time. Moreover, to diminish the 
influence of extraordinary events or scandals in monthly reputational data, consolidated data 
on reputational risks over the last years may be used in the analysis. To extend this line of 
research on the basis of negative media coverage, scholars may in future even investigate 
whether higher CSR implementing companies manage to get “back to normality” in a shorter 
period of time than lower CSR implementing companies. 
The results of my analysis may also serve as a basis for future research to analyze the 
relationship between the design of global accountability standards and the presence of 
“decoupling”. Haack et al. (2012) recently analyzed the “Equator Principles” credit risk 
management framework. Their findings suggest that “decoupling” was indeed necessary to 
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achieve higher degrees of CSR implementation in the long run, as it generated the critical 
mass necessary for change in the first place. Further research could test the existence of a 
similar process between the development of the UNGC framework and its actual 
implementation.  
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Table 2: Matching the CC “Civil“ stage criteria with the UNGC Advanced criteria 
Framework 
CC category 
CC criteria 
CC assessment tool “Civil” stage 
(acc. to Baumann and Scherer 2012) 
 
UNGC Advanced 
implementation criteria 
Commitment 
Strategic integration/ 
Leadership support 
• CC significant value in company’s mission 
statement and all other documents  
• Respecting stakeholders’ demands is 
central to the company’s mission.  
• CC used by top management to justify 
company decisions.  
• Legal compliance and compliance with the 
Code is equally important. 
• Criterion1: The COP describes C-
suite and Board level discussions of 
strategic aspects of Global Compact 
implementation 
• Criterion 5 (9/13/17): The COP 
describes robust commitments, 
strategies or policies in the area of 
human rights (labour/ 
environmental stewardship/ anti-
corruption) 
• Best practice: Written company 
policy (e.g., in code of conduct) 
CC-Coordination • CC-Committee is drafting the CC strategy 
in line with the overall company strategy.  
• Recommendations are forwarded to the 
Executive Committee, which decides over 
the implementation on a periodic basis.  
• A CC- department is in charge of 
coordinating the implementation process. 
• Top management is directly and regularly 
involved. 
• Criterion 2: The COP describes 
effective decision-making processes 
and systems of governance for 
corporate sustainability 
• Criterion 5 (9/13/17): (see above) 
• Best practice: Allocation of 
responsibilities and accountability 
within the organization 
Structures & Procedures 
Alignment of policies 
and procedures 
• All elements of the CC- commitment 
translated into policies and procedures.  
• These are the basis for all business 
processes, including the management of 
the global supply chain.  
• Policies and procedures regularly 
reviewed and revised; feedback from 
internal and external stakeholders is 
integrated. 
• Criterion 5 (9/13/17): (see above) 
• Criterion 6 (10/14/18): The COP 
describes effective management 
systems to integrate the human 
rights (labour/ environmental/ anti-
corruption) principles  
• Criterion 21: The COP describes 
implementation of the Global 
Compact principles in the value 
chain 
Alignment of 
incentive structures 
• Incentive structure is fully aligned with 
the commitment to CC  
• Important factor for assessing individual 
performance.  
• Decisions over promotion and bonus 
depend on respect for CC principles. 
• Criterion 2: (see above) 
• Best practice: Executive incentive 
structures promoting sustainability 
strategy in line with Global 
Compact principles 
Provision of training 
on CC requirements 
• Training is provided to all employees to 
prepare for decision-making situations and 
encourage discussion. 
• Training courses are adapted to the 
company’s context  
• Specific groups within the organization 
are targeted for follow-up courses. 
• Company shares training material  
• Initiates the development of training 
material for innovative topics. 
• Criterion 6 (10/14/18): (see above)  
• Best practice: Internal awareness-
raising and training 
Creation of a 
complaints procedure 
• Confidential complaints channel is 
provided 
• Easy access guaranteed 
• Criterion 6 (10/14/18): (see above)  
• Best practice: Grievance 
mechanisms, communication 
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• Procedure is communicated  
• Cases are analyzed to further improve the 
systems. 
• Reporting is a duty. 
channels and other procedures 
(e.g. whistleblower mechanisms) 
for reporting concerns or seeking 
advice 
Evaluation of CC 
implementation 
• Impact assessment methods of CC 
initiatives are developed in multi-
stakeholder forums. 
• Methods are revised regularly 
• Results are discussed publicly (both, 
positive and negative). 
• Criterion 7 (11/15/19): The COP 
describes effective monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms of human 
rights (labour/ environmental 
stewardship/ anti-corruption) 
integration 
• Criterion 24: The COP is 
independently verified by a 
credible third-party 
Reporting on CC • CC-data is fully integrated in the annual 
report.  
• CC-data is produced based on KPIs that 
are gathered regularly 
• GRI guidelines are followed.  
• Regular reporting on good practices and 
lessons learnt in the context of CC. 
• Transparency of targets, means and 
measurements. 
• Criterion 23: The COP incorporates 
high standards of transparency and 
disclosure  
• Criterion 8 (12/16/20): The COP 
contains standardized performance 
indicators (including GRI) on 
human rights (labour/ 
environmental stewardship/ anti-
corruption) 
• Criterion 22: The COP provides 
information on the company's 
profile and context of operation 
• Criterion 24: The COP is 
independently verified by a credible 
third-party 
Interaction 
Quality of 
stakeholder 
relationships 
• Engagement with stakeholders on a 
regular/need basis.  
• Dialogue with stakeholders is seen as a 
necessary seismograph for society’s 
changing awareness of particular issues. 
• Civil society’s expertise is regarded as a 
valuable asset in order to problem-solve. 
• Criterion 3: The COP describes 
engagement with all important 
stakeholders 
• Criterion 6 (10/14/18): (see above)  
• Best practice: Regular stakeholder 
consultations 
• Best practice: Inclusion of 
minimum human rights () 
standards in contracts with 
suppliers and other relevant 
business partners 
Level of participation 
in collaborative CC-
initiatives 
• Membership in CC- initiatives 
• Including verification organizations 
• Share CC good practice examples and 
lessons learned.  
• Proactive engagement and efforts to 
integrate companies that are not yet 
members. 
• Criterion 4: The COP describes 
actions taken in support of broader 
UN goals and issues 
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Table 3: Results of Regression Analysis for Determinants of UNGC Implementationa 
Variable     UNGC Implementation  UNGC+Implementation 
Membership years       0.02***    0.02***   
Size (lnEmployees)                   0.037***           0.041*** 
Region (“USA“ omitted) 
Africa             0.017               0.018    
Asia (excluding countries below)         -0.106              -0.103    
 China           -0.082              -0.082    
 India            -0.106      -0.121   
 Republic of Korea          0.076               0.130    
 Japan             0.127*              0.147*   
Central America          -0.004               0.001    
Eastern Europe           -0.039              -0.024    
Turkey             0.162*              0.170*   
Latin America (excl. countries below)       0.045               0.077    
 Argentina          -0.030              -0.018    
 Brazil           -0.017               0.012    
 Colombia          -0.050              -0.030    
MENA               0.198**            0.229**  
Oceania            -0.036              -0.025    
Western Europe (excl. countries below)    0.037               0.048    
 Austria           -0.019              -0.023    
 Denmark           0.091               0.110    
 France           -0.308***          -0.296*** 
 Germany           0.003               0.011    
 Italy             0.216*              0.234*   
 Spain             0.277***           0.323*** 
 Sweden           -0.016              -0.015    
 Switzerland           0.009               0.005    
 United Kingdom         -0.059              -0.052    
Canada            -0.052              -0.057    
Mexico            -0.003               0.000    
Supersectors (Automobiles & Parts omitted) 
Banks               0.134               0.122    
Basic Resources          -0.001               0.003    
Chemicals            0.077               0.082    
Construction & Materials          0.124               0.115    
Equity/Non-Eq. Invest. Instrum.    -0.111              -0.108    
Financial Services          -0.011              -0.003    
Food & Beverage          -0.028              -0.036    
Health Care            0.112               0.121    
Industrial Goods & Services           0.072               0.070    
Insurance            0.138               0.124    
Media              -0.046              -0.050    
Oil & Gas            0.073               0.095    
Personal & Household Goods          0.060               0.050    
Real Estate            0.035               0.032    
Retail              0.013              -0.007    
Technology            0.049               0.056    
Telecommunications           0.091               0.113    
Travel & Leisure          -0.056              -0.047    
Utilities             0.231**             0.258**  
Ownership type (“Private company“ omitted) 
Public company     0.076**             0.080*   
State-owned company    -0.018              -0.015    
Subsidiary      0.100*              0.096    
Constant                       1.442***           1.398*** 
R2      0.150               0.148  
a N = 2280. All coefficients are OLS regression coefficients.   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4: 
Results of OLS Regression Analysis for Relationship between UNGC Implementation 
and UNGC/CSR Riska 
      UNGC Risks (11/11 - 05/12) CSR Risks (Nov2011) 
Variable                   Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4      
UNGC Implementation -0.404    -0.672                 
UNGC+ Implementation  -0.305    -0.884    
Membership years 0.000** 0.000**  0.003** 0.003**  
Employees (ln) 0.950*** 0.956***  5.033*** 5.073*** 
Region (“Africa“ omitted) 
Asia 1.067 1.115  11.461** 11.363**  
Europe 1.273 1.312  12.123** 12.174**  
Latin America 2.480* 2.576*  15.630** 15.848**  
MENA 3.152* 3.193*  7.392  7.368    
North America 2.042** 2.100**  18.710*** 18.614*** 
Oceania 2.437** 2.510**  17.675** 17.633**  
Industry (“Basic Materials“ omitted) 
Consumer Goods -1.108 -1.110  -13.759** -13.856**  
Consumer Services -3.158 -3.168  -18.344** -18.517**  
Financials -2.217** -2.217**  -11.299* -11.460*   
Health Care -3.165*** -3.173***  -12.586* -12.659*   
Industrials -1.625 -1.631  -15.655** -15.660**  
Oil & Gas -0.415 -0.389  3.682  3.690    
Technology -0.737 -0.750  -17.252*** -17.233*** 
Telecommunications -3.686*** -3.681***  -18.289*** -18.290**  
Utilities -1.036 -1.050  -8.188  -8.192    
Ownership type (“Private company“ omitted) 
Public company 0.965 0.943  5.295*  5.158*   
State-owned company -1.655 -1.656  -3.425  -3.787    
Subsidiary -1.131 -1.154  1.775  1.684    
 
Constant 2.689 2.371  3.555  3.842     
R2       0.347  0.346   0.347 0.348  
a N = 160. All coefficients are robust regression coefficients. 
    * p<0.05 
  ** p<0.01 
*** p<0.001 
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Appendix 1: The Ten Global Compact Principles 
 
Area      Principles  
Human rights P1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of 
internationally proclaimed human rights; and 
   P2 : make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses. 
 
Labor conditions P3 : Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the 
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 
   P4 : the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour; 
   P5 : the effective abolition of child labour; and 
P6 : the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation. 
 
Environment P7 : Businesses should support a precautionary approach to 
environmental challenges; 
P8 : undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental 
responsibility; and 
P9 : encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally 
friendly technologies. 
 
Anti-corruption P10 : Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, 
including extortion and bribery. 
Source: UNGC (2012a) 
